Maritime Security and the Capacity Building Challenge:Introducing the SafeSeas Best Practice Toolkit by Bueger, Christian
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet







Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Bueger, C. (2019). Maritime Security and the Capacity Building Challenge: Introducing the SafeSeas Best
Practice Toolkit. Seychelles Research Journal, 1(2), 149-56.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2020
Seychelles Research Journal, Volume 1, Number 2, August 2019 Page 149 
 
Research Notes…  
 
Maritime Security and the Capacity Building 
Challenge: Introducing the SafeSeas Best Practice 
Toolkit  
 
Christian Bueger (i)  
 
 
Maritime Security is one of the preconditions for developing the blue economy. 
Maritime crimes, ranging from piracy, smuggling to illegal fishing, or the lack of 
compliance with environmental laws and regulations, undermine the efforts to protect 
the environment, create employment and harvest ocean resources sustainably.1 While 
the importance of maritime security is generally recognized, the majority of countries 
continue to struggle with developing the capacities required. This challenge is substantial 
for small island states in particular, which need to govern vast maritime spaces with very 
limited human and financial resources, but also in coastal countries with generally weak 
security institutions and government capacities.  
 
Substantial efforts are underway to address capacity-building gaps. The investments in 
maritime security have significantly increased in the past decade; a wide range of 
international programs for capacity building have been set up. Yet, progress seems slow. 
How can the capacity gap be better addressed? This was the core question that the 
SafeSeas network was trying to answer.2 Setting out to capture the experience in 
maritime security capacity building in the Western Indian Ocean, the goal of the project 
was to collect core lessons and to develop best practices. The result of the project: a best 
practice toolkit for capacity building (SafeSeas, 2018). In the following I provide an 
introduction to the rationale of the tool kit as well as an overview of its core insights.  
 
 
Maritime security is a complex challenge 
 
Maritime security is a complex and often ambiguous policy field. It gains its complexity, 
firstly, by combining and integrating diverse maritime challenges. These are associated 
with traditional defense and seapower concerns, such as the protection of sovereignty 
and borders, human security challenges, such as the welfare and food security of coastal 
populations, marine safety issues, including search and rescue, disaster response or port 
security, as well as issues of environmental protection and blue growth (Bueger, 2015). 
                                                          
1 For a discussion of the link between maritime security and the blue economy, see Bueger (2018) and Voyer et al. 
( 2018). 
2 For an introduction to the SafeSeas network see www.safeseas.net.  
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In consequence, secondly, maritime security not only requires dedicated policies and 
strategies capable of integrating and prioritizing responses to these issues, but also the 
close coordination of the diverse agencies responsible (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017). 
Since maritime security is a cross-cutting issue, the number of agencies involved can be 
substantial, including, but not limited to, navies, coastguards, police, border guards, 
customs, marine authorities, fishery agencies, port security, or environmental regulators. 
Also, non-state actors play a considerable role, ranging from artisanal and industrial 
fisheries, the transport, tourism and extractive industry to recreational users of the sea. 
Thirdly, the majority of maritime security challenges are cross-boundary issues involving 
various overlapping jurisdictions and responsibilities (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017), 
ranging from flag state and port state control, to the provisions of the UN Convention of 
the Law of the Sea, and other international treaties such as the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Crime. Maritime security has hence a considerable 
regional and international dimension. No country can deal with it on its own, but is 
dependent on working collaborations with other states and international organizations. 
In other words, maritime security is not easy to govern. It requires new thinking. The 
following sections summarize core insights of the SafeSeas best practice tool kit.  
 
 
Best practices as thinking tools 
 
Maritime security governance and capacity challenges differ widely across countries and 
regions. Not only have countries different sea spaces to govern, they have different 
traditions and institutions already in place. Capacity challenges can be very different in 
character. Take the example of human resources. Small island countries, like Seychelles 
or Tonga, tend to have small populations and hence face problems of identifying, 
training and retaining sufficient staff levels for maritime security agencies. In countries 
with large populations, such as Kenya or the Philippines, this problem is rather different. 
Here the challenge lies more in training and education. Identifying best practices for 
maritime security capacity building should not rely on elaborate universal tools for use 
across countries without a translation process. Each country and region is different. 
Nonetheless, it is important to develop tools which draw on the experiences of countries, 
and which trigger the necessary thinking to strengthen a country’s maritime security 
provision. In this sense, best practices need to be always understood as ‘promising 
practices’, as ideas that promise to provide new directions and improvements which, 
however, require to be translated and adapted to a local context. This is the 
understanding of best practices that underlay the SafeSeas best practice tool kit.  
 
The tool kit discusses a set of experiences in maritime security capacity building from 
countries of the Western Indian Ocean region, including, but not limited to Seychelles, 
Kenya, and Djibouti. On that basis it outlines a set of thinking tools and models which 
are useful to plan and implement capacity building. By virtue, these tools are formulated 
to be beneficial for both the receivers and the providers of capacity building. Providers 
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and receivers need to understand the intricate nature of maritime security and what 
makes it difficult to build capacity. Receivers need to think carefully about how they 
plan, coordinate and implement capacity building projects with their partners. Providers 
need to adjust how they intervene in countries and how their projects influence the local 
institutions and political constellations both in the short as well as in the long term.  
 
 
Maritime security governance needs solid problem analysis  
 
Maritime security governance needs to be grounded in a solid understanding of the 
problems and concerns that affect a country the most. While there are definitions of 
maritime security available, these often take the character of a laundry list of issues. 
They are a valuable starting point, but each country needs to identify for itself which of 
these concerns affect the population the most. For instance, illegal fishing will be a core 
concern for many large ocean countries, while issues of maritime terrorism, or illegal 
migration through the sea, might be less pressing concerns. Other issues arise from the 
international obligations and standards that a country has agreed to comply to by 
ratifying international treaties, such as the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea or the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and its International Ship and Port 
Facility Security Code, or the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) Agreement on Port State Measures.  
 
Identifying these issues and prioritizing them is both an intellectual but most essentially a 
political task, in so far as it concerns the spending of public resources. Grounded in such 
a problem analysis a good understanding of existing resources and institutions is the next 
requirement. Which agencies handle which issues, and how? How is the flow of 
information between them organized, and how is inter-operability ensured, and are 
synergies between them realized? What resources are available on a regional level? 
Might an issue be better addressed as a national or a regional problem? These are some 
of the questions that need to be asked. The answers to them can inform a needs 
assessment. What capacity gaps exist and need to be filled?  
 
While international partners can assist in the process of gaining that understanding, the 
prioritization of issues, and the evaluation of existing resources and capacities cannot be 
delegated to them. This analytical and policy work needs to be led and conducted by 
countries themselves in order to ensure political support, but also to guarantee that the 
country actually benefits overall from external assistance, and that it leads to sustainable 
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Organizing maritime security governance: Some ingredients 
 
One of the most promising ways through which a country can organize the process of 
analyzing and assessing problems, existing capacities and institutions, and requirements 
for capacity building, is through the drafting of a maritime security strategy document. A 
maritime security strategy can be an effective way of organizing maritime security 
governance through outlining problems, capacities, and needs, but essentially also by 
clarifying the roles and responsibilities of different maritime security entities.  
 
The drafting of maritime security strategies requires an open and inclusive process in 
which all affected agencies participate, in which the political level is closely involved, as 
are all users of the sea. Such an open consultative process ensures the buy in of political 
parties and agencies. Maritime security strategies also benefit if they have a review 
procedure and are accompanied by an action plan with measurable achievements and 
accountability mechanisms. Strategies tend to succeed if they are not overly ambitious 
and general, but problem driven and directly linked to implementable projects.  
 
A maritime security strategy is one cornerstone in a maritime security governance 
system. In addition, effectivity is ensured through a coordination committee and a 
maritime domain awareness center. A national coordination committee conducts the 
policy steering work by providing direction to agencies involved. The committee is also 
the link between agencies and the political level and oversees the drafting, 
implementation and review of the maritime security strategy as well as the work of the 
maritime domain awareness center. It also organizes the (diplomatic and operational) 
liaison work to other countries by appointing points of contacts and liaison personnel.  
 
An additional component is the maritime domain awareness center. The term maritime 
domain awareness refers to efforts in understanding what happens at sea and what issues 
arise that require attention. A maritime domain awareness center is where the different 
types of information that is collected about activities at sea are fused and analyzed. Such 
information includes data from sensors tracking vessels at sea, from surveillance and 
patrols, but also from human sources, such as the fishers and recreational users of the 
sea. In maritime domain awareness centers these data sources are brought together and 
compiled into trend analyses or intelligence briefs. Since such an analysis is vital, not 
only for law enforcement agencies but also for the wider understanding of the security 
implications of the maritime environment; for policy makers and the general public 
maritime domain awareness can be understood as the engine room of a national maritime 
governance system. National maritime domain awareness centers also provide an 
important link to regional centers which have been installed in all major world regions in 
order to share data and analysis between countries. In the Western Indian Ocean this 
kind of information sharing is provided, for instance, by the Regional Maritime 
Information Fusion Center based in Madagascar, and the Information Fusion Centre – 
Indian Ocean Region operated by the Indian Navy.  
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Effective maritime security governance is hence composed of at least three elements: a 
maritime security strategy, a coordination committee, as well as a maritime domain 
awareness center. Some countries complement that system by multi-agency task forces 
which address particular maritime security issues, or operational coordination centers 
which are directed at ensuring inter-operability between maritime security agencies as 
well as the effective use of resources, such as fuel.  
 
If these are the main ingredients, maritime security governance should not be treated as 
an exclusively technical affair. Strong links to the parliament and political parties are 
important – primarily provided through the coordination committee – as are close 
associations with the public and the broader maritime security community consisting of 
all users of the sea – provided by the media and education work of an maritime domain 
awareness center. Also, the relation between maritime security and environmental 
protection and the blue economy is vital to ensure that these efforts are closely 
integrated, and concerns over maritime security and law enforcement at sea are, for 
instance, considered in marine spatial planning efforts. These integrations are also 
important to ensure public awareness of the importance of the sea. In many countries the 
attention to the security implications, but also to the economic potential of the sea, 
continues to be sparse.  
 
 
In the driver’s seat: Negotiating external assistance 
 
In setting up these institutions and maintaining them, as well as in advancing the skills, 
expertise and equipment to enforce the law at sea, many countries will seek external 
assistance. Indeed, a growing range of donors provides assistance programs. In the 
Western Indian Ocean region these are, for instance, provided by the UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime’s Global Maritime Crime Programme, by the International Maritime 
Organization or by donors such as the European Union, the United States, Denmark, 
France or the United Kingdom.  
 
Accepting assistance from these programs can be an important means to improving 
maritime security governance and reaching the objectives set out in a maritime security 
strategy. It is however important that countries carefully negotiate this assistance. Not 
only do capacity builders often bring their own agendas and ideas of how to approach 
matters, careful consideration is required of whether capacity building offers actually fit a 
country in the long run. More is not always better. Learning two different styles of 
information analysis or boarding might be confusing for an agency and creates internal 
tensions. An additional patrol vessel is only useful if a country holds the needed 
maintenance skills and spare parts are easily available. The overall costs for operating the 
vessel need to be taken into consideration. The hidden costs of training need to be kept in 
mind. A staff member on a training course cannot perform his or her regular duties. The 
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saturation point for an agency to effectively utilize  training and integrate new skills also 
needs to be kept in mind.  
 
In accepting capacity-building assistance, receiving countries have to stay in the driving 
seat and should not assume that the providers coordinate among themselves well, or that 
they have a thought through plan for a country. In particular, donor countries and 
capacity-building providers tend to rely on short-term thinking, in that their assistance is 
project driven. The project logic implies that capacity building is oriented towards 
delivering of short-term, clearly measurable outcomes to prove success and impact. This 




Assisting countries in capacity building: Learning lessons 
 
As the SafeSeas tool kit highlights, these core take-away points have also considerable 
consequences for those providing capacity-building assistance. Capacity-building 
providers need to start out from a detailed analysis of how they can actually assist a 
country. This, first of all, implies a detailed understanding of what the core issues and 
problems are that a country wants to address in their maritime security policy. These 
problematizations might not necessarily be the same as those of the providers. 
Deliberating these and developing a common ground with the hosting country is an 
important first step. Capacity builders also need to conduct a detailed and ongoing 
assessment of the existing resources and institutions, as well as what other capacity-
building projects are already underway in a country. This should include an analysis of 
the political context in which the capacity building project intervenes. What are the 
political consequences of the intervention? 
 
One of the core hindrances for effective capacity-building assistance can be the flexibility 
of programming. The situation in a country can transform rapidly, and given the 
multiplicity of capacity-building providers also the requirements of a country can change 
substantially in a short time frame. This can only be addressed through flexible 
programming which is based on a continuous negotiation with the receiving country. 
Without flexible programming the time-lag between the planning and implementation 
phases of a project, can imply that projects are outpaced by developments on the ground.  
 
Capacity-building provision benefits from high levels of transparency concerning what 
kind of projects are planned, are currently being carried out, or have been implemented 
in the past. Transparency ensures that lessons from past projects are learned, and 
addresses the problem that capacity building provision is often not well coordinated 
between providers.  
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Capacity builders also need to zoom out and think beyond the horizon of a single project 
(planned or implemented). For countries to benefit it is important that providers have a 
solid understanding of the national as well as regional context within which they 
operate. This is to foster coordination between projects and activities, but also to avoid 
counterproductive effects caused by duplication of efforts.  
 
 
Building capacity is an effort of decades, rather than years  
 
Now, and in the future, capacity building will be required for improving maritime 
security. Building this capacity is an effort of decades, rather than years. The lack of 
enforcement of law at sea is a core challenge for all of the promises associated with the 
blue economy. Building capacity for maritime security and the blue economy is not 
primarily a technical challenge, it requires broad political commitment. It requires the 
ongoing commitment of all users of the sea, and the political recognition of the 
importance of the sea. For making capacity building more effective, attention to the past 
failures and success stories is vital, as is the recognition that receiving countries have to 
be in the driving seat. These are some of the core insights from the SafeSeas tool kit. 
Which maritime security governance systems, forms of operational coordination and 
information sharing are most effective in each country, and which means of building 
capacity are the most promising requires ongoing attention by both analysts as well as 
those directly involved in maritime security on an everyday basis. This will also include 
paying more attention to cross-regional, lessons-learned exercises. What for instance can 
the Western Indian Ocean countries learn from their Southeast Asian counterparts? 
What lessons are relevant for the small island states across different regions? Finally, 
more effort is required to go beyond training, and build the analytical capacities required 
for maritime security governance. Too much of the analysis continues to be carried out 
in the Global North. Countries will benefit from strong local research and education 
institutions. This is to respond to the need for ongoing analysis of maritime security, but 
also these institutions can act as a watchdog or facilitate a public discourse involving 
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